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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
Plaintiff Eugene F. Assaf brought this civil rights action 
against the Pennsylvania state officials responsible for his 
dismissal from public employment. Assaf's complaint, 
invoking 42 U.S.C. S 1983, charges that appellees George C. 
Fields and Gary E. Crowell terminated his employment for 
political reasons, thereby violating the First Amendment 
protections for belief and association. The District Court, in 
ruling on the defendants' motion for summary judgment, 
concluded that Assaf 's job was not one for which party 
affiliation is an appropriate requirement but nonetheless 
entered summary judgment for defendants on the basis of 
qualified immunity. Assaf v. Fields, 999 F. Supp. 622, 630- 
33 (M.D.Pa. 1998). Assaf filed a timely appeal. Our review 
of the grant of summary judgment is plenary. See Boyle v. 
County of Allegheny Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d 
Cir. 1998). 
 
II. 
 
The record, reviewed in a light favorable to Assaf, reveals 
the following: Assaf was hired in October 1988 as Director 
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of the Bureau of Vehicle Management for the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Assaf, a registered 
Democrat, was hired by then-Secretary of General Services 
David Jannetta, who was also a registered Democrat. At the 
time Assaf was hired, Robert Casey, also a Democrat, was 
Governor of Pennsylvania. 
 
The Bureau of Vehicle Management is an agency within 
the Department of General Services. Assaf reported to the 
Deputy Secretary for Procurement, appellee George Fields. 
Fields in turn reported to the Director of the Department of 
General Services, appellee Gary Crowell. Crowell's position 
was a cabinet-level one. 
 
Assaf was advised in writing of his employment as a Fleet 
Maintenance Manager (also referred to as Director of the 
Bureau of Vehicle Management) and that his position was 
under the Senior Management Service, a category of 
Commonwealth positions "in the unclassified service which 
have broad policy participation and management 
responsibility." As such, he was exempt from 
unemployment compensation coverage but covered by the 
Management Benefits Program. He was further advised that 
in that position he "serve[s] at the pleasure of the agency 
head." 
 
Assaf 's job description listed as "Major Duties" of the 
position: "Directs the Bureau of Vehicle Management to 
meet the transportation needs of all requesting 
Commonwealth Departments, Agencies, and Commissions 
while remaining within the financial guidelines of self- 
generated income." The job description enumerated ten 
specific duties: 
 
       1. Participates with the Deputy Secretary in planning, 
       developing and implementing appropriate standards, 
       procedures and policies for obtaining and maintaining 
       the Commonwealth Automotive Fleet. 
 
       2. Stays abreast of the automobile market and 
       recommends when to purchase vehicles based on 
       current sales volume, amount of income received,fixed 
       and semi-fixed expenses, variable expense, andfixed 
       overhead expense. 
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       3. Determines the best type of vehicles to purchase. 
       . . . 
 
       4. Directs the operation of the Commonwealth Garage 
       concerned with the service and repair of the automotive 
       fleet. Negotiates and administers regular maintenance 
       contracts with service Agencies and with dealerships 
       for repair and preventative maintenance. 
 
       5. Directs the maintenance of all records and reports 
       concerning the Commonwealth Fleet. . . . 
 
       6. Oversees the disposition of the Commonwealth 
       owned vehicles. These vehicles are sold through an oral 
       auction which is open to the public. Makes sure that 
       all activities are carried out according to approved 
       policy. Interacts with the general public whenever 
       concerns arise. 
 
       7. Directs the payments of repair invoices from 
       various vendors. . . . 
 
       8. Oversees the repair of vehicles at the 
       Commonwealth Garage. . . . 
 
       9. Directs the temporary vehicle fleet making it 
       available for use by the requesting Commonwealth 
       Agencies to meet their temporary transportation needs. 
       . . . 
 
       10. Works closely with the various Bureau Chiefs and 
       supervisory personnel to maintain an efficient, logical 
       and financially sound operation. 
 
Assaf supervised the three divisions that made up the 
Bureau: the Administrative Division, the Vehicle Operations 
Division, and the Vehicle Maintenance Division. He directly 
supervised the three employees who headed these divisions. 
The Bureau as a whole employed a total of thirty-three to 
forty-six employees over whom Assaf exercised indirect 
supervision. His starting salary was $37,000 and at the 
time he was terminated his salary had risen to $52,000. 
 
From the written description, it might have appeared that 
Assaf 's title as Director signified a public official with 
significant authority. Admittedly, the Director ran the day- 
to-day operation of the Bureau, which entailed overseeing a 
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fleet of approximately 8,000 vehicles. However, Assaf 
testified to the substantial limits of his authority. For 
example, the Director did not have the ultimate authority to 
hire employees within the Bureau. See Assaf at 50.1 There 
is evidence that he also did not have the authority to fire 
Bureau employees. See James W. Martin at 31; Gregory 
Green at 8-9. Rather, such authority rested ultimately with 
the Deputy Secretary for Procurement, a position held by 
Fields. See Green at 9. At most, Assaf could formally 
reprimand employees who were under his indirect 
supervision, which he did on a number of occasions. See 
Assaf at 57-60. 
 
Assaf testified that he had no authority over the Bureau's 
budget or purchasing decisions and did not negotiate 
maintenance contracts with outside vendors. See  Assaf at 
39, 41, 44. Although Assaf assigned vehicles to the various 
agencies, Fields had to approve each such decision and 
Fields retained control over executive vehicle assignments. 
See Fields at 65-66. Maintenance of the Commonwealth 
vehicles was performed at the Commonwealth Garage, and 
although Assaf could approve outside repair shops if they 
accepted the standard contract from the Commonwealth, 
the rates for payment were set according to a 
predetermined formula. See Assaf at 43-44; Fields at 61. 
 
Similarly, although Assaf was listed as having 
responsibility for auctions, in fact the vehicle auctions were 
conducted pursuant to a formula used to select the 
vehicles, and vehicles could not be auctioned unless Fields 
approved the lists. The target prices for the vehicles at 
auction were also set by a formula, see Fields at 62-63, and 
the formula preceded Assaf's tenure, see Assaf at 60. 
 
On January 21, 1995, Thomas Ridge, a Republican, was 
sworn in as Governor of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania. Shortly after Governor Ridge's inauguration, 
Jannetta resigned as Secretary of General Services and 
Governor Ridge appointed Gary Crowell, a Republican, in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Throughout this opinion all citations to deposition testimony will be 
referenced by the name of the deponent followed by the page number of 
the transcript. 
 
                                5 
  
his stead. Governor Ridge reappointed Fields as Deputy 
Secretary for Procurement. 
 
On March 29, 1995, Fields notified Assaf by letter that 
his services were no longer needed. Fields at 44. The 
termination decision was made by Secretary Crowell. 
Crowell at 22-23. According to Assaf, Fields informed him 
that his termination was for political reasons. See Assaf at 
76-77. Fields denies discussing with Assaf whether politics 
were involved. See Fields at 44. 
 
Assaf applied for unemployment compensation pursuant 
to the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law. His 
application was ultimately denied by the Pennsylvania 
Unemployment Board of Review, which ruled that Assaf 
was not entitled to benefits because his was "a major non- 
tenured policymaking" position and therefore specifically 
exempted from the unemployment compensation scheme. 
 
On March 5, 1997, Assaf filed this lawsuit in the District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, charging that 
Fields and Crowell violated the First Amendment by 
terminating his employment for political reasons. Fields 
and Crowell moved for summary judgment. Without 
conceding that Assaf had in fact been fired for political 
reasons, they urged that Assaf's job was, in any event, not 
one for which the First Amendment provides protection. In 
the alternative, they argued that even if Assaf 's position 
was constitutionally protected they were nonetheless 
entitled to qualified immunity because the unlawfulness of 
the dismissal would not have been apparent to reasonable 
officials under clearly established law. 
 
In ruling on the defendants' motion, the District Court 
first rejected the defendants' argument that Assaf had 
received the position through political patronage and could 
not now complain that he lost the position for a similar 
reason. See Assaf, 999 F. Supp. at 628 (citing Branti v. 
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 512 n.6 (1980) (rejecting argument 
that "because the [employees] knew the system was a 
patronage system when they were hired, they did not have 
a reasonable expectation of being rejected when control of 
the office shifted to [another party].")). The court next 
rejected defendants' argument that political affiliation was 
 
                                6 
  
a qualification for the job. The court noted that"the 
overarching factor is whether the worker has `meaningful 
input into decision making concerning the nature and 
scope of a major [government] program.' " Id. at 630 (citing 
Peters v. Delaware River Port Auth., 16 F.3d 1346, 1353 (3d 
Cir. 1994)). The District Court concluded that "overseeing 
the cars owned by the Commonwealth and used by its 
agencies . . . is not a major government program . .. [as it 
does not] involve services to the general public or to a 
sizable portion of the public." Id. The court thus ruled that 
Assaf was entitled to First Amendment protection from 
political discharge. Nonetheless, it held that the defendants 
were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not 
clearly established that Assaf could not be fired for political 
reasons. See id. at 633. 
 
III. 
 
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the record 
discloses that "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The record is to be 
examined in a light most favorable to the non-movant, in 
this case, Assaf. See Peters v. Delaware River Port Auth., 16 
F.3d 1346, 1349 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
At the outset, we note that the only issue before us on 
this appeal is the propriety of the District Court's ruling 
that Fields and Crowell were entitled to qualified immunity. 
Although much of appellees' brief appears directed to the 
question of whether Assaf's position was "inherently 
political," Appellees' Br. at 25, the appellees have neither 
cross-appealed the ruling on that issue nor have they 
included this as one of their issues on appeal. Accordingly, 
we will focus on the District Court's determination that 
under clearly established law, reasonable officials would not 
have perceived that terminating Assaf for political reasons 
was unconstitutional. This necessarily requires that we 
review the applicable law, with particular attention to the 
dates the leading opinions were announced. 
 
In Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991), the 
Supreme Court explained that "the proper analytical 
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framework" for addressing qualified immunity claims is to 
ascertain first whether plaintiff's claims make out a 
violation of a constitutional right. See also Brown v. 
Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1110 (3d Cir. 1990). Only if 
such a violation has been alleged need we proceed to 
determine whether, in the light of "clearly established law," 
the unlawfulness of the action would have been apparent to 
a reasonable official. See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232 ("A 
necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the 
constitutional right asserted by the plaintiff is `clearly 
established' at the time the defendant acted is the 
determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a 
violation of a constitutional right at all."); County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, ____ n.5, 118 S. Ct. 
1708, 1714 n.5 (1998) ("As in any action under S 1983, the 
first step is to identify the exact contours of the underlying 
right said to have been violated."). 
 
The Supreme Court first established the proposition that 
as a general matter, a public employer cannot, consistently 
with the First Amendment, terminate a public employee for 
political reasons in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). In 
writing for a three-Justice plurality, Justice Brennan 
reasoned that because requiring financial and campaign 
assistance to the favored political party "is tantamount to 
coerced belief " and a required pledge of allegiance 
"compromise[s] the individual's true beliefs," id. at 355, it 
follows that "the practice of patronage dismissals clearly 
infringes First Amendment interests," id. at 360. He also 
reasoned that conditioning public employment on 
patronage support "inhibits protected belief and 
association." Id. at 359 (citing, inter alia, Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)). 
 
He recognized that the prohibition was not absolute, but 
allowed an exception only for those in "policymaking" 
positions "to insure that policies which the electorate has 
sanctioned are effectively implemented." Id. at 372. The 
plurality opinion states that "[i]n determining whether an 
employee occupies a policymaking position, consideration 
should . . . be given to whether the employee acts as an 
adviser or formulates plans for the implementation of broad 
goals." Id. at 368. The Court concluded, however, that the 
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employees whose terminations were at issue in Elrod, (the 
chief deputy of the process division of a sheriff's office, a 
process server, a process division employee, and a bailiff 
and security guard at a county juvenile court) did not fall 
within the exception. 
 
The concurring opinion, written by Justice Stewart on 
behalf of himself and one other Justice, declined to 
comment on the first of the plurality's two rationales (that 
a patronage system tended to coerce employees into 
compromising their true beliefs) but agreed with the second 
rationale, i.e. that patronage dismissals effectively imposed 
an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public 
benefit. The two concurring Justices also agreed that the 
Elrod plaintiffs did not fall within the class of employees 
with "policymaking" responsibilities who were exempted 
from First Amendment protection. See id. at 374-75. 
 
Four years later, in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), 
a firm majority of the Court, this time speaking through 
Justice Stevens, reiterated that the First Amendment 
prohibits discharge of public employees for their party 
affiliation. In Branti, the Court addressed the district 
court's conclusion, affirmed by the court of appeals, that 
assistant public defenders were not the type of 
policymaking, confidential employees exempted from the 
general prohibition on politically motivated dismissals. The 
Court eschewed overreliance on labels such as 
"confidential" or "policymaking" and stated that "[i]n sum, 
the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label `policymaker' 
or `confidential' fits a particular position; rather, the 
question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate 
that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the 
effective performance of the public office involved." Id. at 
518. Applying this standard, the Court agreed that 
assistant public defenders did not fall within the exception 
to the general prohibition against politically motivated 
dismissals from public employment. See id. at 520. 
 
The Branti-Elrod decisions were widely publicized, 
particularly among officials in positions in state and local 
governments who have authority to hire and fire 
government employees. It is reflective of this general 
knowledge that Fields and Crowell do not contend that they 
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were unaware of the severe limitation that was now placed 
on terminations because of political affiliation. All that 
remained after Branti-Elrod was the application of the 
principle to the positions of the plaintiffs who brought suit. 
 
Illustrations were soon forthcoming from all the circuits. 
This court applied and elaborated on the principles 
enunciated in Elrod and Branti in a series of cases decided 
over the last eighteen years. The year after the Branti 
decision, we stated in Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 521 
(3d Cir. 1981), that the Court's opinion calls for a 
"functional analysis," which entails an examination of 
whether "a difference in party affiliation[would] be highly 
likely to cause an official to be ineffective in carrying out 
the duties and responsibilities of the office," in which case 
a dismissal for political reasons "would not offend the First 
Amendment." We noted that the Elrod plurality suggested 
that "employees who act as advisers, who formulate plans 
for implementing broad goals, or whose responsibilities are 
either not well defined or of broad scope are more likely to 
function as policymakers." Id. at 520 (citing Elrod, 427 U.S. 
at 367-68). Because the duties of the plaintiffs in Ness, the 
city solicitor and assistant city solicitors of York, 
Pennsylvania, included "rendering legal opinions, drafting 
ordinances, [and] negotiating contracts" for the city, which 
we concluded were "intimately related to city policy," we 
held that party affiliation was an "appropriate (even if not 
necessary) requirement" for their effective performance. Id. 
at 522. 
 
Again, in Brown v. Trench, 787 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1986), 
we held that the Assistant Director of Public Information for 
a Pennsylvania county could be dismissed on account of 
her political affiliation because her "position is one which 
cannot be performed effectively except by someone who 
shares the political beliefs of the Commissioners." Id. at 
170. Although we reversed judgment for the defendants 
because Brown had not been given a pretermination 
hearing, we used that decision as a vehicle to "specif[y] the 
factors that indicate that a position falls within the Branti 
test." Id. at 169. Looking to cases decided by other courts, 
we identified as relevant "whether the employee's duties are 
simply clerical or related to law enforcement" or 
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"nondiscretionary or technical," "whether the employee 
participates in Council discussions or other meetings, 
whether the employee prepares budgets or has authority to 
hire or fire employees, the salary of the employee, and the 
employee's power to control others and to speak in the 
name of policymakers." Id. (citations omitted). 
 
After reviewing these considerations, we concluded that 
the "key factor seems to be not whether the employee was 
a supervisor or had a great deal of responsibility but 
whether the employee has `meaningful input into 
decisionmaking concerning the nature and scope of a major 
[government] program.' " Id. at 169-70 (quoting Nekolny v. 
Painter, 653 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1981)). This factor was to 
be determinative in many of the cases we decided 
thereafter. 
 
In Zold v. Township of Mantua, 935 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 
1991), we were called upon to decide whether the politically 
motivated discharge of a deputy municipal clerk violated 
the First Amendment. Synthesizing our case law on the 
subject, we stated that 
 
       the ultimate inquiry . . . is whether the hiring authority 
       can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate 
       requirement for the effective performance of the 
       particular office involved. . . . [S]hould a difference in 
       party affiliation be highly likely to cause an official to 
       be ineffective in carrying out the duties and 
       responsibilities of the office, dismissals for that reason 
       would not offend the First Amendment. The burden of 
       proof is on the defendant to demonstrate an overriding 
       interest in order to validate an encroachment on an 
       employee's First Amendment rights. 
 
Id. at 635 (quotation marks and citations omitted). In light 
of these principles we concluded that the deputy municipal 
clerk--whose duties included "acting as (1) secretary to the 
governing body, (2) secretary of the municipal corporation, 
(3) election official and (4) administrative official on the 
municipal level," id. at 637--was not a position for which 
political firing was permissible. See id. at 640. 
 
In addition to holding the politically motivated discharges 
of the deputy clerk impermissible in Zold, we also found 
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impermissible the discharge of a second deputy recorder of 
deeds, see Furlong v. Gudknecht, 808 F.2d 233, 238 (3d 
Cir. 1986); a deputy sheriff, see Burns v. County of 
Cambria, 971 F.2d 1015, 1022 (3d Cir. 1992); and a deputy 
director of marketing and communications for a county 
aviation department, see Boyle v. County of Allegheny 
Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 386, 401 (3d Cir. 1998). On the 
other side of the line, we found that political affiliation was 
relevant for a director of a state agency concerned with the 
provision of veterans' benefits, see Waskovich v. Morgano, 2 
F.3d 1292, 1303 (3d Cir. 1993), a secretary of an interstate 
port authority, see Peters, 16 F.3d at 1359, as well as the 
county assistant director of public information referred to 
above, see Brown, 787 F.2d at 170. 
 
The District Court's conclusion that Assaf's position was 
not one for which political affiliation may be required was 
fully supported by the evidence submitted in connection 
with the summary judgment issue, as Assaf did not have 
significant input into a major government program within 
the contemplation of our case law. However, the District 
Court proceeded to hold that it was not clearly established 
that Assaf 's position was one for which political affiliation 
could not be required and that therefore the defendant 
officials were entitled to qualified immunity. It offered three 
rationales for this conclusion. 
 
The first was that "except for Waskovich, the existing 
Third Circuit precedent provided no guidance." Assaf, 999 
F. Supp. at 633. However, Waskovich itself emphasized the 
same factors identified in our prior cases: whether the 
employee had "meaningful input into decision making 
concerning the nature and scope of a major [government] 
program." Waskovich, 2 F.3d at 1297 (quoting Brown, 787 
F.2d at 169-70). Instead, the District Court's analysis 
appears to require a closer factual correspondence between 
the case under examination and prior decided cases than is 
consistent with qualified immunity doctrine and its 
application by this court. 
 
When deciding whether the law is clearly established, the 
Supreme Court has cautioned against looking at the 
constitutional issue too abstractly. Anderson v. Creighton, 
483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). Rather, the right the official is 
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alleged to have violated must have been `clearly established' 
in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: 
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 
violates that right." Id. at 640. On the other hand, "This is 
not to say that an official action is protected by qualified 
immunity unless the very action in question has previously 
been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre- 
existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent." Id. 
(citation omitted). 
 
Given the nature of the inquiry in the Branti-Elrod cases, 
we reject appellees' argument that qualified immunity is 
"well suited to cases where there is no `bright line' rule." 
Appellees' Br. At 12. Were we to adopt this position, we 
would effectively eviscerate the constitutional imperative 
behind Branti-Elrod jurisprudence. Under the qualified 
immunity regime contemplated by appellees, liability in 
such areas could never attach because the lack of"bright 
line" rules inherent in the doctrine would continually 
provide cover for violations of constitutional rights. In an 
earlier case in which we rejected the defendants' qualified 
immunity claim, we explained that if we were to require 
" `precise factual correspondence' between the case at issue 
and a previous case . . . we would not be `faithful to the 
purposes of immunity by permitting . . . officials one 
liability-free violation of a constitutional or statutory 
requirement.' " Burns, 971 F.2d at 1024 (quoting People of 
Three Mile Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'rs, 747 F.2d 
139, 144-45 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
 
Contrary to the District Court's assertion, our cases have 
given guidance to government officials within our circuit. 
An employee may be terminated for political reasons only if 
"a difference in party affiliation [is] highly likely to cause an 
official to be ineffective in carrying out the duties and 
responsibilities of the office," Waskovich, 2 F.3d at 1297 
(internal quotation marks omited), and that only if an 
employee's duties make it possible to cause "serious 
political embarrassment," id. at 1302, will the position meet 
the narrow Branti-Elrod exception. 
 
We have noted that the inquiry into the employee's duties 
is a "fact specific" one, id. at 1297 (quoting Zold, 935 F.2d 
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at 635), and that although we look to "the functions of the 
public office in question and not the actual past duties of 
the particular employee involved," id. (quoting Brown, 787 
F.2d at 168) (alteration and internal quotation marks 
omitted) evidence of past job duties may be, and often is, 
informative, see Peters, 16 F.3d at 1353. 
 
Officials to whom this court applied the Branti-Elrod 
exception before Assaf 's termination, such as the director 
of an interstate port authority charged with, inter alia, the 
responsibility for developing a master economic plan for an 
interstate district, in Peters, 16 F.3d at 1354-55, the 
director of a state veteran's services agency responsible for 
overseeing the delivery of benefits and services to veterans, 
in Waskovich, 2 F.3d at 1297, and the secretary for a 
county's office of public information charged with duties 
such as "preparing and distributing press releases, 
contacting media representatives, and promoting county 
projects," and who hence represented the county 
government to the public, in Brown, 787 F.2d at 168, were 
those with responsibility connected to major government 
programs. The common thread among them is that their 
positions related to the government's activity vis-a-vis the 
public. That is, these positions entail the formulation or 
implementation of policies that have a direct impact on the 
public or the representation of government policies to the 
public. 
 
By contrast, Assaf was charged with the responsibility of 
directing--within a very narrow compass of authority--an 
agency overseeing the Commonwealth's motor pool. While 
this is, to be sure, an important function, it is not a "major 
government program" in the sense that phrase is used in 
our case law. The acquisition, maintenance, and disposition 
of the Commonwealth's vehicles is a largely endogenous 
function of the state government and as such serves an 
internal and practical purpose--supplying vehicles to 
Commonwealth agencies and executives, maintaining these 
vehicles, and overseeing the purchase and sale of the 
vehicles. There is nothing in these functions that would 
lead a reasonable official to conclude that the Director of 
the Bureau of Vehicle Management made such politically 
sensitive policy judgments that the Director need have a 
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common political philosophy with the incumbent political 
regime. 
 
Moreover, Assaf's position did not involve significant 
contact with the public. He did not represent the 
Commonwealth or speak in its name, and was thus unlike 
the plaintiff in Brown who "present[ed] the views of the 
[County] Commissioners to the press and public on a daily 
basis." 787 F.2d at 170. Assaf's only interaction with the 
public occurred at the auction of the surplus fleet vehicles, 
plainly not the type of public appearance that requires the 
employee to hew to a particular party's line. As the District 
Court noted, to the extent that this function involves 
interaction with the public, it is "a tiny segment of the 
public, who appear voluntarily for what is essentially a 
commercial transaction--the purchase of a car." Assaf, 999 
F. Supp. at 630. 
 
It should not have been difficult to see that far from 
representing the government, as was the plaintiff's duty in 
Brown, Assaf's public contact was much more like that at 
issue in Zold, where we found that political allegiance was 
not an appropriate criterion for the decision to terminate 
the plaintiff. In Zold, the public contact of the plaintiff, the 
deputy township clerk, was more extensive than Assaf's, 
involving as it did "informing reporters about the agenda of 
upcoming meetings and . . . receiving inquiries and 
complaints from the electorate . . . and responding in kind." 
935 F.2d at 638 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
We reject appellees' argument that our decision in 
Waskovich could have been understood by reasonable 
officials to render the political firing of Assaf lawful. The 
plaintiff in Waskovich was the former Director of the New 
Jersey Division of Veterans' Administrative Services, and as 
such was responsible for the administration of services and 
benefits to an estimated 900,000 veterans throughout the 
state. See Waskovich, 2 F.3d at 1302. Although Waskovich 
oversaw the day-to-day operations of veterans' facilities, he 
also advocated for the veterans that were in the state's care. 
See id. at 1300. We described his role as that of a 
government official who "orchestrate[s] the provision of 
veteran services." Id. at 1302. In holding Waskovich's 
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position exempt, we emphasized that Waskovich had 
significant policymaking authority with respect to this 
position, and that "he was involved in policy matters on a 
day-to-day basis, that he made recommendations on policy 
matters on several occasions, that his superiors asked for 
his views of major policy proposals such as capital 
improvement programs, and that he often opposed policies 
they espoused." Id. at 1300. 
 
Assaf's position, on the other hand, concerns the 
administration of the state's fleet of vehicles. Without 
denigrating the importance of such a position, there is no 
reason to conclude that high state officials would have 
analogized Assaf's position to Waskovich's. In light of 
Assaf's lack of any significant contact with the public and 
the undisputed fact that Assaf's level of responsibility did 
not touch on politically sensitive issues, which would raise 
the likelihood of serious political embarrassment, no official 
cognizant of the existing precedents of this court could have 
concluded that the modest managerial responsibilities over 
the Commonwealth agencies' fleet of cars would constitute 
meaningful input into a major government program. 
 
The second reason given by the District Court for its 
qualified immunity decision was that Assaf's status as 
"middle management" made it objectively reasonable for 
appellees to believe that his position was subject to 
patronage dismissal. Nothing in this circuit's precedents 
suggests that middle managers qua middle managers are 
more likely to fall within the exception than other types of 
employees. In fact, not one of our Branti-Elrod  decisions 
even mentions the term "middle management" or"middle 
manager." To the contrary, as we observed in Brown, 
managerial or supervisory authority, by itself, does not 
suffice to bring a position within the Branti-Elrod exception. 
See Brown, 787 F.2d at 169-70. In short, to label someone 
a middle manager says nothing about whether or not that 
person has significant policy-making responsibilities that 
make adherence to the incumbent party's political 
philosophy a necessary job requirement. 
 
In a similar vein, the District Court suggested that the 
division of authority between the Seventh Circuit in Selch v. 
Letts, 5 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 1993), and the Fourth Circuit 
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in Akers v. Caperton, 998 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1993), 
supports the determination that it was unclear whether 
Assaf's duties were such that he was subject to patronage 
dismissal. These cases have little to say about the kind of 
position involved here, nor do they stand for the 
proposition, implicit in the District Court's analysis, that 
middle managers may be subject to political firing. Selch 
concerned the position of "subdistrict superintendent," a 
job that involved "plan[ning the] annual workload and 
determin[ing] resource requirements based upon that plan; 
--investigat[ing] and tak[ing] corrective action on 
complaints and information requests from the general 
public; [and] --provid[ing] personal supervision, personnel, 
and equipment during emergencies, such as snow and ice 
removal, detours, accidents, and road repairs, etc." Id. at 
1044-45. Akers involved the holder of a similar job--that of 
"county maintenance superintendent." The Seventh Circuit 
in Selch held that the position was one for which patronage 
dismissal was constitutionally permissible; the Fourth in 
Akers had held the opposite. 
 
The Selch and Akers plaintiffs had a great deal of 
responsibility to decide how the physical maintenance of 
streets gets done, and, as is well known, local political 
regimes can stand or fall on the incumbents' ability to fix 
potholes and remove snow. In any event, those decisions 
from other circuits cannot reasonably have been relied on 
by officials in a state within this court's jurisdiction when 
this court has numerous opinions to serve as guidance on 
the subject. 
 
The final reason offered by the District Court in support 
of qualified immunity was the observation that"Assaf's 
duties were not merely technical, he participated in 
meetings, and he could control others." Assaf, 999 F. Supp. 
at 633. This description, however, could just as well apply 
to any public employee with a measure of supervisory 
responsibility. Although Assaf met with the Deputy 
Secretary every two weeks along with the other Bureau 
Directors, occasionally met with Fields alone, and on three 
occasions attended out-of-state programs held by the 
National Association of Fleet Administrators that 
highlighted products and involved discussions of fleet 
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management techniques, these functions say nothing 
significant about the extent to which his duties required 
that he have the same political affiliation as the incumbent 
regime. 
 
In his position as Director of the Bureau of Vehicle 
Management for the Commonwealth, Assaf had 
management responsibilities in three principal areas: (1) 
obtaining and maintaining the Commonwealth's fleet of 
vehicles; (2) directing the operation of the Commonwealth 
Garage (i.e., supervising the maintenance of the fleet); and 
(3) overseeing the disposition of Commonwealth-owned 
vehicles at auction. These duties do not involve matters 
that have an impact on the public nor does the Bureau 
Director represent the government in its interactions with 
the public. It would be manifestly unreasonable for officials 
to believe that such an intragovernmental operation as the 
management of the state's fleet of vehicles involves 
politically sensitive matters. 
 
Although Assaf's lack of input into a program that can 
be considered major is sufficient to establish that it should 
have been apparent to reasonable officials that his job was 
protected under the First Amendment, it should also have 
been known to his superiors that Assaf's level of 
responsibility within the Bureau was not very significant. In 
particular, the record suggests that Assaf did not enjoy the 
power to hire or fire employees, but only to reprimand 
them. He directly supervised only three employees. He 
oversaw the purchase of vehicles, but did not have 
authority to make purchasing decisions for the 
Commonwealth. He had no input into his budget. As 
Bureau Director, he managed the Commonwealth Garage, 
but had no authority to negotiate maintenance contracts 
with outside vendors. Assaf oversaw the administration of 
the auctions, but the selection of cars and the target prices 
to be achieved at auction were set by formula, not 
according to the Director's initiative. Although Assaf 
instituted a set of procedures for the conduct of the auction 
when he learned of dissatisfaction with the auction process, 
the minor nature of the changes, i.e. changing the process 
for counting money, installing a locking door on the auction 
stage, and attempting to ensure that the target prices were 
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obtained, see Assaf at 93-95, show the technical nature of 
his input. 
 
Appellees make much of the fact that Assaf forwarded to 
Fields a suggestion for altering the formula for calculating 
the labor rates for maintenance contracts (a suggestion 
ultimately adopted by Fields), but we do not find in this 
event an indicium of "significant input into broad goals" 
sufficient to support qualified immunity. Leaving aside the 
fact that the suggestion was not, in the first instance, the 
product of any initiative on Assaf's part, the narrow ambit 
of the suggestion and the fact that it was up to Fields to 
make the ultimate decision as to whether it would be 
implemented further suggest that such "broad goals" as the 
Bureau may have had were firmly in the control of Fields, 
not Assaf. As the District Court aptly summed up, "the 
plaintiff ran the day-to-day operation of the Bureau, but 
Fields kept a `tight rein.' " Assaf, 999 F. Supp. at 626. 
 
In an earlier Branti-Elrod case, we rejected the 
defendants' contention that the right at issue was not 
clearly established, stating that "we are satisfied that the 
decisions of this court have been sufficiently consistent to 
have clearly established to all state and municipal 
employers that firing or other adverse employment action 
for political reasons contravenes the Constitution unless 
defendants could show that the particular position came 
within the narrow exception." Burns, 971 F.2d at 1024. 
That conclusion is just as applicable here. Here, as in 
Burns, the defendants "should have related this established 
law to the instant situation." Id. at 1025, (quoting Hicks v. 
Feeney, 770 F.2d 375, 380 (3d Cir. 1985) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 
The nature and limits of Assaf's responsibilities and 
authority were not unknown to defendants Fields and 
Crowell. After all, it was Fields to whom Assaf directly 
reported, and Fields in turn reported to Crowell. In fact, 
Crowell who, as the Secretary of General Services, was 
responsible for Assaf's termination, testified at his 
deposition that party affiliation was not an appropriate 
requirement for the job. See Crowell at 61. In Burns, we 
saw no reason why any "reasonable employer" would have 
thought that the employee "could be fired for political 
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reasons." Burns, 971 F.2d at 1024. Any hypothetical 
reasonable official should have known that the limited 
nature of Assaf's authority would place his position in line 
with those that we held were protected by the First 
Amendment in Zold (deputy municipal clerk who ran day- 
to-day functions of the clerk's office), Furlong (second 
deputy recorder of deeds, who satisfied mortgages, recorded 
documents and forwarded taxes to the relevant authorities), 
and Burns (deputy sheriff who was responsible for serving 
process, transporting prisoners, and guarding courtrooms). 
 
Consequently, we hold that a reasonable official would 
not have concluded under clearly established law that 
political loyalty could be required for Assaf's position. 
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons set forth, we will reverse the decision of 
the District Court granting summary judgment to 
defendants on the ground that they have qualified 
immunity. As the defendants have argued that they did not 
dismiss Assaf for political reasons, we will remand for 
further proceedings. 
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